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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE AU, AND THE 
ICC: LEGITIMACY UNDERMINED
Christa-Gaye Kerr*
The International Criminal Court (the “ICC” or “the Court”) was 
created with the expectation that it would supplement regional and national 
judicial systems and that it would be a court of last resort.1 The Rome 
Statute highlights that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crime.”2 Because of its 
supplementary role, the ICC’s jurisdiction can only be invoked in limited 
situations: namely, when regional and national courts are unwilling or 
unable to prosecute criminals, when the United Nations Security Council 
(“UNSC”) instructs the Court to act, or when individual states refer 
situations to the Court.3 In its sixteen-year history, the Court’s jurisdiction 
has been invoked through all three methods, resulting in charges in eleven 
cases.4 In ten of these cases, the defendant has been African.5
The disproportionality of these numbers has led to criticism that the 
ICC is just another tool for enforcing Western political influence over 
international justice.6 The Court’s critics see its record of failing to 
prosecute serious international crimes outside of Africa as “sidelin[ing] 
* Articles Editor, Michigan Journal of International Law; J.D. Candidate, University 
of Michigan Law School, 2020. I would like to thank the MJIL editors who worked on this 
piece for their invaluable feedback and keen attention to detail. I would also like to thank 
Professor Laura Beny for her constant encouragement and her belief. To my family and 
friends, thank you for your unwavering support through law school and through this process.
1. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, About, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019).
2. Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct. pmbl., 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Id. arts. 13–15 ter. As outlined in article 13, “[t]he Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of 
this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in 
accordance with article 15.” Id.
4. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Situations Under Investigation, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
pages/situations.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter ICC Situations] (stating that the 
ICC currently has investigations ongoing in Burundi, Georgia, Central African Republic [two 
cases], Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Lee J. M. Seymour, The ICC and Africa: Rhetoric, Hypocrisy 
Management, and Legitimacy, in AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE, 107, 109 
(Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016).
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Africans as it favours Western intervention in the guise of universal 
justice.”7
The African Union (“AU”) is one of the loudest critics of the ICC and 
its disproportionate indictments. The African Union was launched in July 
2002 with the goal of “realis[ing] Africa’s potential”8 by focusing on the 
“cooperation and integration of African states to drive Africa’s growth and 
economic development.”9 The AU—comprised of all of the African states 
recognized by the United Nations (“UN”), along with the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic—lists its goals as:
Defend[ing] the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence 
of its Member States; . . . promot[ing] and defend[ing] African 
common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its 
peoples; encourage[ing] international cooperation; promot[ing] 
peace, security, and stability on the continent; promot[ing] 
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and 
good governance; [and] promot[ing] and protect[ing] human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with . . . human rights instruments.10
With these goals in mind, the African Union has come to see the ICC’s 
prosecutions of African heads of state as undermining the growth and 
stability it is trying to achieve.11 Its claims that the ICC acts as a tool to 
promote Western influence over Africa and Africans stem from the belief 
that the ICC’s work is prejudiced and that the Court undermines the 
advances that had been made, and that are being made, by Africans in ways 
that are similar to the “scramble for Africa”12 formalized at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884.13
7. Id.




11. African Union Assembly, 13th Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/
Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, ¶ 3 (July 3, 2009).
12. The “scramble for Africa” was the occupation, division, and colonization of 
African territory by European powers from 1881 to 1914, culminating in the Berlin 
conference. See Patrick Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of 
the Dark Continent, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 166 (1985) (containing an in-depth discussion on 
the Berlin Conference and the scramble for Africa).
13. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in Africa?,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2013/10/17/can-
the-international-criminal-court-play-fair-in-africa; Marisa O’Toole, Africa and the International
Criminal Court: Behind the Backlash and Toward Future Solutions, BOWDOIN DIGITAL 
COMMONS 1, 18–21 (2017); Rowland J. V. Cole, Africa’s Relationship with the International 
Criminal Court: More Political Than Legal, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 670 (2013).
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Beginning when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir in 2009,14 these claims of prejudice have soured 
the once congenial relationship between the AU and the ICC.15 Since that 
time, the ICC has issued indictments against at least twenty-one other 
Africans and has investigated at least six situations in African countries.16
The AU vehemently opposed some of these indictments on the grounds that 
they violate the sovereign immunity that state leaders hold.17 Consequently, 
the ICC’s decisions to continue pursuing these indictments led the AU to 
call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC’s founding treaty, 
the Rome Statute.18 The AU’s position has been met with both support and 
contempt.19
This note examines the ICC’s treatment of sovereign immunity, 
specifically through the indictments of al-Bashir and Kenya’s President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. These three 
indictments have drawn particular criticism from the AU for violating the 
principle of sovereign immunity.20 Through the lens of these indictments, 
this note concludes that the ICC’s tendency to ignore sovereign immunity—
perhaps as a result of the Court’s close relationship with the UNSC—does 
little to help it gain legitimacy in Africa and in the wider world and, more 
than anything, undermines the noble work encoded in the ICC’s mandate. 
To show this, the note first delves into the background of the two
organizations (the AU and the ICC) and the relationship they had prior to al-
Bashir’s first indictment (Part I). It then examines the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and how the ICC has managed to make the defense nugatory for 
both States Parties and non-State Parties (Part II). Next, this note looks at 
the current relationship between the two organizations and how the 
breakdown in their relationship caused by the ICC’s treatment of sovereign 
14. Abel S. Knottnerus, The AU, the ICC, and the Prosecution of African Presidents, in
AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 154 (Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016); 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal 
Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 385, 
386–87 (2013).
15. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152–53. See also Cole, supra note 13, at 671.
16. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Cases, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). To date, the ICC has publicly indicted forty-four people. Id. Twenty-one of those 
people are African and were indicted after al-Bashir. Id. Since al-Bashir’s indictment, the ICC 
has investigated situations in seven countries, six of which are African countries. Id. Those 
countries are Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Burundi. 
Id.
17. African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013).
18. Seymour, supra note 6, at 107–08.
19. See Aoife F. Martin, Note, Stop Letting Them Get Away with Murder: The Need to 
Limit the Use of Head of State Immunity as a Defense for War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 923, 938–39 (2015).
20. Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 388–89; INT’L CRIM. CT., Darfur, Sudan: Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan ICC-02/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
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immunity has delegitimized the ICC, at least in Africa (Part III). Lastly, this 
paper presents the AU’s response to the legitimacy crisis and proposes 
solutions for the ICC that would see the Court sever (or lessen) its 
relationship with the UNSC, adopt transparency measures that would help it 
return to the initial principles that brought African nations on board in the 
first place, and integrates aspect of legal (and cultural) institutions from the 
countries it investigates to help create a sense of cooperation between the 
Court and the nations it serves (Part IV).
I. History of the International Criminal Court 
and the African Union
The creation of the ICC was lauded as “a gift of hope to future 
generations and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human 
rights and the rule of law.”21 The Court was created on July 17, 1998, when 
120 states adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the 
“Rome Statute” or the “Statute”). The Rome Statute entered into force on 
July 1, 2002 after ratification by sixty countries.22 The ICC’s primary 
function is to prosecute individuals for four international crimes: genocide, 
war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity.23 These 
crimes are seen as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole[, which] must not go unpunished.”24
The AU’s relationship with the ICC began amicably. Indeed, African 
states and organizations were among the first proponents of the creation of 
the Court.25 In addition, African lawyers and human rights campaigners 
made significant contributions during campaigns for the creation of the 
International Criminal Court.26 Africa’s support for the ICC originated from 
the belief that the Court would help to uphold the rule of law when it came 
to the abuses and aggressive actions of more powerful states and would give 
African States Parties a more prominent position within international 
society.27 For African states, the ICC was to be the bastion of justice that 
brought an end to the impunity that other, more powerful, states had 
flaunted.28
21. U.N. Secretary General, Secretary-General Says Establishment of International 
Criminal Court Is Major Step in March Towards Universal Human Rights, Rule of Law, U.N.
PRESS RELEASE L/2890 (July 20, 1998).
22. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, About, supra note 1. On April 11, 2002 sixty-six states 
ratified the Rome Statute–surpassing the sixty-state ratification threshold–allowing the 
Court’s temporal jurisdiction to begin on July 1, 2002.
23. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
24. Id.
25. Ssenyonjo supra note 14, at 385–86.
26. Seymour, supra note 6, at 108.
27. Id. at 107.
28. Id.
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On February 2, 1999, Senegal was the first state to ratify the Rome 
Statute, followed soon after by Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, and the Central African Republic.29 Currently, thirty-four African 
states, or two-thirds of all AU Member States, are represented among the 
States Parties to the Rome Statute.30 This makes Africa the largest regional 
bloc represented in the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties and “underscores 
the stakes in the present crisis of Africa-ICC relations.”31
The breakdown in camaraderie between the AU and the ICC began with 
the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.32 The relationship 
worsened after the ICC issued arrest warrants for Kenyan heads of state 
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, and it continues to deteriorate today 
because of what the AU sees as the Court’s continued bias in pursuit of 
African heads of state.33 In particular, the AU argues that the numerous and 
unabating prosecutions of Africans have created issues of “prosecution 
versus peace; arrest versus immunity; and trial [participation] versus 
presidential responsibilities.”34 The AU sees the ICC’s indictment and 
prosecution of African leaders as both hypocritical and a threat to the 
stability and sovereignty that heads of state are granted through customary 
international law.35 As a result, the AU has chosen to adopt a policy of 
obstruction towards the ICC.36
A.  The Prosecution of Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir
In 2009, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC issued an initial arrest warrant 
for al-Bashir for war crimes committed since 2003 in the Darfur region.37
The case was referred to the ICC by the UNSC in 2005, under Resolution 
1593.38 The ICC issued this arrest warrant with the intention of bringing 
justice to victims of the genocide and curbing the impunity that al-Bashir 
had enjoyed since the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur.39 The Court 




32. Ssenyonjo supra note 14, at 385–91.
33. Seymour, supra note 6, at 108–09.
34. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 153.
35. Seymour, supra note 6, at 108; Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152.
36. Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 386–87.
37. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 223–36
(Mar. 4, 2009). On 14 July 2008, the ICC’s Prosecutor filed ten charges of war crimes against 
al-Bashir, including three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of 
murder. Id.
38. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
39. Id.
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for genocide.40 That arrest warrant alleged that al-Bashir masterminded and 
implemented plans to annihilate three Sudanese ethnic groups—the Fur, 
Masalit, and Zaghawa—through murder, rape, and deportation.41
However, some members of the AU did not see the arrest warrants as a 
means for bringing justice to the region.42 Instead, they decried what they 
saw as an injustice against the sitting head of a state that was not party to the 
ICC’s governing Rome Statute.43 Former Libyan President and then AU 
Chairman Muammar Gaddafi44 described al-Bashir’s indictment as a form 
of terrorism instigated by the First World and as an effort “by [Western 
states] to recolonize their former colonies.”45 Arab and African leaders also 
saw al-Bashir’s arrest warrant as a way to undermine the “unity and 
stability” that Sudan had developed under al-Bashir’s reign.46
Since the issuance of the arrest warrant, al-Bashir has traveled to and 
from countries both inside and outside of Africa with impunity.47 After the 
thirteenth African Union Summit in 2009, the AU released a declaration 
stating that the members of the Union would “not co-operate pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities for the arrest and surrender of Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir to the ICC.”48 Soon afterward, South African President Jacob Zuma 
affirmed that his country would not extradite al-Bashir, and, true to his 
40. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest, at 8 
(July 12, 2010).
41. Id. at ¶ 8.
42. Seymour, supra note 6, at 113–14.
43. Id. While the Rome Statute does not expressly give the ICC jurisdiction over non-
parties, the UNSC’s ability to refer cases to the ICC gives the Court de facto jurisdiction over
states that are parties to the UN Charter but not the Rome Statute. See infra Part II.
44. Gaddafi’s morality is questionable (as he himself was a dictator against whom the 
ICC would bring charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes in 2011), but, as one of 
the founders of the African Union, its former Chairperson, and the loudest voice against al-
Bashir’s indictments, his statements on the matter provide valuable insight into the reasons for 
the deteriorating relationship between the AU and the ICC.
45. Sudan Leader in Qatar for Summit, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2009), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7970892.stm.
46. Arab Leaders Snub al-Bashir Warrant, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/03/2009330175846714662.html.
47. Bashir Travel Map, BASHIR-WATCH, http://bashirwatch.org (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). Since the issuance of the first arrest warrant against him, al-Bashir has travelled outside 
of the African continent to India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
48. African Union Assembly, 13th Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/
Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, ¶ 10 (July 3, 2009); Bathandwa Mbola, AU leaders will not Extradite Al 
Bashir, SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEWS AGENCY (July 6, 2009), http://www.
sanews.gov.za/south-africa/au-leaders-will-not-extradite-al-bashir.
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word, he refused to do so when al-Bashir visited South Africa in 2015—in 
contravention of the Court’s order.49
Before his visit to South Africa in 2015, al-Bashir’s most notable visits 
within the African continent were to Chad and Kenya in 2010.50 In July 
2010, al-Bashir visited Chad to attend the Summit of the Sahel-Saharan 
States.51 At the time of al-Bashir’s visit, Chad’s Interior and Security 
minister stated, “We are not obliged to arrest Omar Hassan al-Bashir[.] 
Bashir is a sitting president. I have never seen a sitting president arrested on 
his travels by the host country.”52 Chad’s decision not to arrest al-Bashir 
made it the first State Party to the Rome Statute to harbor “knowingly and 
willingly[,] a fugitive . . . wanted by the Court.”53
The Republic of Kenya also hosted President al-Bashir in August 2010, 
inviting him to celebrate the signing of Kenya’s new constitution.54 In 
response to allegations that Kenya was flouting article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute, the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs explained his government’s 
refusal to execute the arrest warrant by noting his country’s “competing 
obligations toward the Court, the African Union, and regional peace and 
stability.”55
The international community vehemently criticized Chad and Kenya for 
not acquiescing to the ICC’s demand to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the 
Court.56 For instance, the international non-profit human rights organization 
49. Wendell Roelf, South African President Defends Failure to Arrest Sudan’s 
Bashir, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-bashir-
idUSKCN0QB1S520150806.
50. Tom White, States ‘Failing to Seize Sudan’s Dictator Despite Genocide Charge’,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/
21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant; Xan Rice, Chad Refuses to 
Arrest Omar al-Bashir on Genocide Charges, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir. The notoriety of these 
two visits stemmed from how soon after the issuance of the second arrest warrant al-Bashir 
was welcomed into each country; the first of these two trips, to Chad, was on July, 22, 2010, 
just a week after the second arrest warrant was issued, while al-Bashir’s trip to Kenya was 
only a month later on August 27, 2010.
51. Rice, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Chad: Hosting Once Again President al-Bashir Would Be a Further Insult to the 
Victims of Darfur, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/
Chad-should-stand-justice-and-not-grant-impunity-President-al-Bashir.html-0.
54. Kenya Defends Failure to Arrest Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir in Nairobi,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/29/kenya-
omar-al-bashir-arrest-failure.
55. Press Release, Assembly of States Parties, President of the Assembly of States 
Parties Meets Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya, ICC Press Release ICC-ASP-20100921-
PR575 (Sept. 21, 2010).
56. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Sudan Leader Travels Despite Warrant, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
27, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/africa/28sudan.html; Chad Failed to 
Arrest Sudanese President, ICC Tells Security Council, UN NEWS, (Dec. 13, 2011), https://
news.un.org/en/story/2011/12/398212-chad-failed-arrest-sudanese-president-icc-tells-security-
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No Peace Without Justice criticized Chad’s decision and subsequent 
inaction because “[a]s a State Party to the Rome Statute of the [ICC], Chad 
is obliged to arrest any person against whom the Court had issued an arrest 
warrant.”57
B. Prosecution of Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto
In 2010, the ICC issued individual arrest warrants for Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto.58 The warrants 
accused Kenyatta and Ruto of crimes against humanity during the post-
election violence in 2007 and 200859 and were issued through the 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.60
Because Kenya was a party to the Rome Statute, the AU could not 
argue that Kenyatta and Ruto were immune to prosecution by the ICC as 
heads of a state not party to the Rome Statute, as it did in al-Bashir’s case. 
Nevertheless, it argued that Kenyatta and Ruto were immune from 
council; Kenya Refuses to Arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, (Aug. 27, 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/08/kenia-se-
niega-detener-presidente-sudanes; Resolution on Kenya: Failure to Arrest President Omar al-
Bashir, Eur. Parl. Doc P7_TA-PROV(2010)0315, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/201009/20100917ATT82761/20100917ATT82761EN.pdf.
57. Alison Smith, NPWJ Calls on ICC and States Parties to Respond Strongly to 
Chad’s Failure to Arrest President Bashir of Sudan, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, (Jul. 24, 
2010), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/NPWJ-calls-ICC-and-States-Parties-respond-strongly-Chad%
E2%80%99s-failure-arrest-President-Bashir-Sudan.
58. At the time of the indictment, Kenyatta was Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance and Ruto was the Minister of Higher Education, Science, and 
Technology. Kenyatta and Ruto were two of six suspects named by the ICC Prosecutor as 
being responsible for planning and funding violence associated with the 2007–2008 Kenyan 
Crisis, but they were the only people indicted. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-
02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. 01/09-01/11, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 
2012). Despite the indictments, the national awareness of these indictments, and a failed 
petition to bar them from running in the elections because of the indictments, Kenyatta and 
Ruto won the 2013 presidential election, becoming President and Deputy President 
respectively. Paul Ogemba, Uhuru, Ruto Get Green Light to Run for State House, DAILY 
NATION, (Feb. 16, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20130327004140/http://elections.
nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-Ruto-get-green-light-to-run-for-State-House-/-/1631868/1695520/-/
146x14c/-/index.html; Sudarsan Raghavan, Kenyatta Wins Kenya Presidential Election by 
Narrow Margin, WASH. POST, (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/
kenyatta-wins-kenya-presidential-election-by-narrow-margin/2013/03/09/c07ae7fa-88b1-
11e2-9d71-f0feafdd1394_story.html.
59. Specifically, deportation, inhumane acts, murder, persecution, and rape. Prosecutor 
v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11 and Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. 01/09-01/11, supra
note 58.
60. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, Kenya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last visited Dec. 
17, 2019). Actions ex proprio motu are actions “of one’s own accord.” Ex propio motu, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014). The ICC Prosecutor’s ex propio motu powers 
are granted by article 15 of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.
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prosecution while they held office.61 On October 12, 2013, the African 
Union convened an Extraordinary Summit  to discuss the AU’s relationship 
with the ICC.62 There, the AU Assembly, the highest decision-making body 
of the AU, decided “[t]hat no charges shall be commenced or continued 
before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of 
State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity 
during their term of office.”63 It then demanded “[t]hat the trials of President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto, who are the 
current serving leaders of the Republic of Kenya, [] be suspended until they 
complete their terms in office.”64 The AU also claimed that since Kenya had 
such a large role to play in maintaining peace in the Darfur region, arresting 
Kenyatta and Ruto would only serve to undermine, and even upheave, 
related efforts.65 Ultimately, the ICC Prosecutor dropped the charges against 
Kenyatta and Ruto because of witness intimidation.66
The Extraordinary Summit also served as an opportunity for some 
members of the AU to call for a mass withdrawal of African states from the 
ICC and the Rome Statute,67 with the loudest voices coming from Kenya, 
61. Knottnerus, supra note 14. Sovereign immunity will be discussed in Part II, infra.
62. African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013).
63. AFRICAN UNION, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 46A bis, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/
36398-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_
african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf [hereinafter Malabo Protocol].
64. Id. at ¶ 10(i)–(ii).
65. Knottnerus supra note 14, at 154.
66. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of 
Charges (Dec. 5, 2014); Kenya: Official Apology for Past Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/world/africa/kenya-official-apology-for-past-
wrongs.html.
67. Article 127 of the Rome Statute allows for states to withdraw from the agreement. 
The article states:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect 
one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies 
a later date. 
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations 
arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial 
obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any 
cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and 
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and 
which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became 
effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any 
matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on 
which the withdrawal became effective. 
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 127.
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Sudan, Rwanda, Namibia, Chad, Uganda, and Ethiopia.68 In large part due 
to a lack of broader Assembly support for such a drastic measure, these calls 
did not result in a mass exodus from the ICC.69 So far, Burundi is the only 
African nation that has successfully withdrawn from the ICC.70 Although 
Gambia and South Africa initially wished to withdraw from the ICC and the 
Rome Statute, they have since withdrawn their notices of intent to leave.71
(Gambia justified its initial decision to leave as “warranted by the fact that 
the ICC, despite being called the International Criminal Court, is in fact an 
International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people 
of colour, especially Africans.”72 South Africa, meanwhile, cited a “conflict 
of the ICC’s Rome Statute with its domestic laws that grant leaders 
diplomatic immunity.”73)
Similarly, while Kenya indicated a desire to withdraw from the ICC, it 
has not done so. In response to the ICC’s warrants, which it perceived as the 
ICC’s attempt to meddle in its internal affairs, the Kenyan Parliament 
passed a nonbinding motion asking the government to “withdraw from the 
68. African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Ext/
Assembly/AU/Dec. 1, ¶¶ 4–5, 10 (Oct. 12, 2013); See African Union, Withdrawal Strategy 
Document (Draft 2) (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Withdrawal Strategy Document], 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/
icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf.
69. Anthony Wang, On the Failed Authority of the International Criminal Court, INT’L
POLICY DIGEST (Jun. 15, 2018), https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authority-
of-the-international-criminal-court.
70. Burundi First to Leave International Criminal Court, AL JAZEERA, (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/burundi-leave-international-criminal-court-
171027080533712.html. Burundi’s decision is believed to have been precipitated by the 
Prosecutor’s “decision to investigate atrocities meted on civilians and human rights 
violation[s] [in Burundi between 2015 and 2017 arising from] political violence.” See Bob 
Koigi, Future of ICC in Doubt After African Countries Withdraw, EURACTIV (Nov. 11, 2016), 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/future-of-icc-in-doubt-after-african-
countries-withdraw; Toby Sterling & Katharine Houreld, Burundi Rejects International 
Criminal Court War Crimes Investigation, REUTERS, (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-burundi/burundi-rejects-international-criminal-court-war-
crimes-investigation-idUSKBN1DA1IH. 
In 2019, the Philippines also officially withdrew from the Rome Statute, thereby ending its 
official association with the ICC. See Philippines Officially Out of the International Criminal 
Court, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/philippines-
officially-international-criminal-court-190317171005619.html.
71. Gambia’s notice of withdrawal was rescinded after a new government took office. 
South Africa’s was rescinded after the High Court of South Africa ruled that the notice was 
illegal under domestic law because it required parliamentary approval, which was not sought. 
Elise Keppler, Gambia Rejoins ICC, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2017/02/17/gambia-rejoins-icc; South Africa’s Decision to Leave ICC Ruled 
‘Invalid’, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39050408.
72. Joe Bavier, Gambia Announces Withdrawal from International Criminal Court,
REUTERS, (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-icc/gambia-announces-
withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court-idUSKCN12P335.
73. Koigi, supra note 70.
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Rome Statute and repeal the International Crimes Act.”74 However, the 
government did not comply, and Kenya, like Gambia and South Africa, 
remains a State Party to the Rome Statute.
II.  Sovereign Immunity’s Role at the ICC
One of the AU’s main grievances with the ICC concerns the Court’s 
ability to prosecute sitting heads of state, like al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and 
Ruto.75 In particular, the AU argues that the ICC’s attempt to exercise 
jurisdiction over these three men violated the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.76 In other words, according to the AU, al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and 
Ruto are (or were) immune from prosecution by virtue of their roles as 
sitting heads of state for their respective countries.77 Contrary to the AU’s 
assertion, though it is true that all three men hold some immunity because of 
their positions, sitting heads of state do not possess absolute immunity 
simply because they currently hold office.78
A.  Head of State Immunity Generally
Heads of state, whether current or former, used to enjoy absolute 
immunity. The development of international law and the emergence of new 
customs, however, has led to the erosion of this form of immunity.79 As a 
result, under the current theory of “restrictive immunity,” heads of state can 
be prosecuted for certain acts that are deemed egregious, such as war crimes 
74. Firew Tiba, The Prosecution of Sitting Heads of State by the International Criminal 
Court, 21 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 134, 144 (2013).
75. In al-Bashir’s case, this is further complicated by the fact that Sudan is neither a 
signatory nor a Party to the Rome Statute, as mentioned above.
76. See African Union Assembly, 18th Sess., Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/
AU/Dec.397(XVIII), ¶6 (Jan. 30, 2012); African Union Assembly, Extraordinary Sess., 
Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Dec.1, ¶4 (Oct. 2013). 
77. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 152. It should be noted that al-Bashir was ousted from 
his role as head of state on April 11, 2019 by a coup. Ousted Sudanese President al-Bashir 
Moved to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/world/
africa/omar-bashir-prison.html. Kenyatta and Ruto are still the incumbent President and 
Deputy President of Kenya. THE PRESIDENCY, Executive Office of the President,
http://www.president.go.ke/presidency (last visited Dec. 17, 2019); THE PRESIDENCY, Office 
of the Deputy President, http://www.president.go.ke/office-of-the-deputy-president (last visited
Dec. 17, 2019).
78. See, e.g., JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 89–96 (2014); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY 686 (2d ed. 2008); RAMONA PEDRETTI, IMMUNITY OF HEADS OF STATE AND 
STATE OFFICIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 13 (2015); ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE 
IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008).
79. Guénaël Mettraux, et al., Heads of State Immunities, International Crimes and 
President Bashir’s Visit to South Africa, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 577, 583 (2018).
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and crimes against humanity.80 One rationale behind the move towards a 
restricted standard of sovereign immunity is that the “[a]bsolute immunity 
theory does not differentiate between civil or criminal actions, and thus 
provides little recourse for those seeking justice, even if they are seeking it 
for the most grave human rights violations.”81 In contrast, the restrictive 
immunity theory ensures that the defense of immunity can never shield 
human rights violators, thereby allowing for prosecution of perpetrators and 
justice for victims.82
The arrest of General Augusto Pinochet by the United Kingdom in 1998 
is arguably the most salient indication that the norms of international law 
have shifted from absolute immunity to a more restrictive view of sovereign 
immunity. In 1973, Pinochet led a coup d’etat that ousted the then-President 
of Chile, Salvador Allende.83 The violent aftermath of the coup led to 
human rights violations84 for which he was indicted by a Spanish court in 
1998.85 Six days after the court’s indictment, he was arrested in London and 
held there on charges of genocide, torture, hostage-taking, and large-scale 
murder.86 During a hearing  held in London to dismiss the arrest warrant 
issued by the Spanish court, Pinochet claimed immunity under the United 
Kingdom’s State Immunity Act of 1978 as a former head of state.87 The 
House of Lords, however, rejected his defense. It invoked the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, by which any state apprehending an alleged 
perpetrator is deemed competent to exercise its jurisdiction, and decreed 
that international crimes such as torture could not be protected by former-
head-of-state immunity.88 Pinochet’s arrest marked the first time a nation 
used the principle of universal jurisdiction to arrest a foreign head of state 
for crimes that had been committed in that leader’s country.89 Thus, though 
80. Martin supra note 19, at 924.
81. Id. at 928.
82. Id. at 929.
83. See generally, PETER KORNBLUTH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER 
OF ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2d ed. 2013).
84. Pinochet’s regime was responsible for various human rights abuses during its reign, 
including forced disappearances, murder, and the torture of political opponents. Monte Reel & 
J.Y. Smith, A Chilean Dictator’s Dark Legacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/10/AR2006121000302.html.
85. Pinochet Arrested in London, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 17, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/195413.stm.
86. Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 237, 277 (1999).
87. Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the 
Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1596 (2000).
88. Id. at 1598. This decision was overturned because of concerns about the 
impartiality of one of the judges but was later affirmed by a second panel.
89. How General Pinochet’s Detention Changed the Meaning of Justice, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/how-
general-pinochets-detention-changed-meaning-justice. Universal jurisdiction is an international 
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Pinochet died before being convicted, his trial exemplified the increasing 
willingness of countries to hold foreign heads of state accountable for their 
actions, notwithstanding claims of sovereign immunity.90 Moreover, it 
showed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction could be triggered by an 
individual’s participation in genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes.91
The arrest and trial of former Yugoslavian President Slobodan 
Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(the “tribunal” or the “ICTY”) further demonstrates the move towards the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The ICTY indicted Milosevic in 
1999 for crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo War and, a 
year later, added additional charges for violating the laws or customs of war,
breaching the Geneva Conventions in Croatia and Bosnia, and committing 
genocide in Bosnia.92 Milosevic’s trial, which lasted from 2002 until his 
death in 2006, was the first by an international tribunal of a sitting head of 
state for state-sanctioned criminal activities and violations of human rights 
law.93
Notably, Milosevic did not raise the defense of sovereign immunity. 
Some scholars argue that Milosevic did not raise the defense because 
“traditional notions of sovereign immunity [were already] disappearing in 
international law” and that, therefore, the defense would have served little to 
no purpose to his case.94
Evidence of the disappearance of traditional notions of sovereign 
immunity from international law can be found in the ICTY’s founding 
statute, the 1993 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
legal principle that reasons that certain activities are so reprehensible that the usual rules of 
jurisdiction are waived, and any state apprehending the alleged perpetrator is deemed 
competent to exercise its jurisdiction. VALERIE EPPS & LORIE GRAHAM, EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (2d ed. 2015).
90. Martin, supra note 19, at 923.
91. Sison, supra note 87, at 1583–84.
92. See Case No. IT-02-54, Slobodan Milosevic: Kosovo, Croatia & Bosnia, Case 
Information Sheet, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia) (an unofficial document 
detailing indictments against Milosevic including: genocide; complicity in genocide; 
deportation; murder; persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; inhumane acts/
forcible transfer; extermination; imprisonment; torture; willful killing; unlawful confinement; 
willfully causing great suffering; unlawful deportation or transfer; extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly; cruel treatment; plunder of public or private property; attacks on civilians; 
destruction or willful damage done to historic monuments and institutions dedicated to 
education or religion; unlawful attacks on civilian objects).
93. Tiba, supra note 74, at 136; Christina Amanpour et al., Milosevic Indictment Makes 
History, CNN, (May 27, 1999), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/27/kosovo.
milosevic.04.
94. Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State 
Immunity and the Specter of Victor’s Justice, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355, 365 (2004).
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Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The 
statute gave the tribunal the power to prosecute “[a] person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided” in the international 
crimes committed during the Kosovo War.95 This power explicitly extended 
to the prosecution of sovereigns, as the statute further provided that “the 
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government[,] . . . shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.”96
Though the statute creating the ICTY dismissed the notion of universal 
jurisdiction, the tribunal instead justified its unrestricted access to 
Milosevic—despite his role as a sitting head of state—as well as to his 
deputies, through the doctrine of primacy.97 This access changed the 
landscape of sovereign immunity in international law, establishing 
precedent for the prosecution of crimes against humanity carried out by 
state actors.
B.  Sovereign Immunity and the ICC
Both the Pinochet and Milosevic indictments and arrests altered the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and provided a basis for the ICC’s own 
method of sidestepping head-of-state immunity. However, the Court’s 
relationship with sovereign immunity is more similar to that of the ICTY (as 
used in its indictment and prosecution of Milosevic), than to the universal 
jurisdiction that was used in Pinochet’s case.98
The text of the Rome Statute is similar to the text of the ICTY’s 
founding statute. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that 
the defense of sovereign immunity does not bar the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction over persons who are or were heads of state:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for 
reduction of sentence.99
Moreover, the plain language of article 27(2) of the statute clearly 
indicates that head of state immunity is not a valid defense at the ICC:
95. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Res. 827, art. 7(1) 
(May 25, 1993) (amended July 7, 2009 by Res. 1877).
96. Id. art. 7(2).
97. Tiba, supra note 74, at 138.
98. Id. at 142.
99. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 27(1).
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Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.100
Notably, article 27 makes no distinction between states that are party to 
the Agreement and those that are not, and it thus bars the immunity defense 
for all individuals brought before the Court.101 Article 27’s ability to negate 
the head-of-state defense for States is therefore an example of the more 
restrictive standard for sovereign immunity which, as stated above, prevents 
the defense from being used to shield human rights violators.102 By 
employing the restrictive standard, the Court has an avenue through which it 
can accomplish its mandate of securing justice for victims of human rights 
violations across the globe.
Article 13(b) further supplements article 27’s ability to strip head-of-
state immunity, and even extends the statute’s applicability to non-party 
states. Article 13(b) denotes the UNSC’s ability to refer cases to the ICC 
Prosecutor and states that the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over a crime 
if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations[.]”103
As it currently stands, there are 194 signatories to the United Nations.104
Chapter VII of the Charter states that all 194 signatories are legally bound to 
the resolutions passed by the UNSC; this includes resolutions 
recommending that the ICC Prosecutor bring charges against a head of 
state.105 It has been posited that by signing the Charter, each State has
implicitly waived the head-of-state defense in situations where the ICC 
brings charges based on the recommendation of the UNSC, regardless of 
whether the party is a signatory to the Rome Statute.106 This argument 
suggests that the UNSC has universal jurisdiction, which allows it to bypass 
100. Id. art 27(2).
101. Id. While article 27 makes no distinction between States that are party to the Statute 
and those that are not, it is widely accepted that it only applies to States that are party to the 
Statute based on the rules established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. But 
see Sophie Papillon, Has the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir’s
Immunity, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 275, 284 (2010) (discussing article 27’s application to non-
party states and the UNSC’s ability to implicitly remove head of state immunity more 
generally).
102. Martin, supra note 19, at 929–30.
103. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
104. UNITED NATIONS, Overview, https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/
index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
105. U.N. Charter ch. V, art. 25.
106. Papillon, supra note 101, at 280.
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head-of-state immunity when necessary to prosecute international crimes.107
Thus, taken together, articles 27 and 13(b) arguably give the ICC wide 
latitude to exercise jurisdiction over countries that are not party to its 
founding statute.
Nevertheless, while the Court does not recognize sovereign immunity 
as a defense, it does acknowledge that heads of state have certain other 
privileges of diplomatic immunity that may limit the Court’s ability to 
apprehend them.108 Because the ICC lacks a police force, it does not have 
the ability to arrest individuals it charges, and it instead relies on States 
Parties to assist it in the apprehension and extradition of individuals wanted 
by the Court.109 However, the Rome Statute recognizes that there are limits 
to States Parties’ ability to assist in this way.110 Article 98(1) of the Statute 
speaks to the Court’s limitations with respect to States Parties’ obligations 
in assisting with the apprehension of defendants from third-party states.111
The text states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property 
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of 
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.112
In directing the ICC not to proceed with a request for arrest in 
circumstances where a State Party and a third state are involved, article 
98(1) respects the doctrine of diplomatic immunity and ensures States 
Parties are not forced to balance competing legal obligations to the ICC and 
to other states.113
The AU applied article 98(1) to the ICC’s requests to have al-Bashir 
arrested upon his arrival in countries that were States Parties. Like they did 
when the indictment was first announced, the AU argued that because al-
107. Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and Universal 
Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter, 56 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 49, 50–51 (2007) (arguing that 
referrals from the UNSC are the only instance in which the Court exercises universal 
jurisdiction).
108. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98.
109. COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 10 Ways States Can Support the ICC and 
Global Justice, http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/10-ways-states-can-support-icc-and-global-
justice (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
110. Papillon, supra note 101, at 285.
111. But see Johan D. van der Vyver, Note, Prosecuting the President of Sudan: A 
Dispute Between the African Union and the International Criminal Court, 11 AFR. HUM. RTS.
L.J. 683, 683–84 (2011) (arguing otherwise and stating instead that article 98(2) contradicts 
article 27(2)).
112. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98(1).
113. Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 421 (2004).
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Bashir was the current head of a third-party state who enjoyed diplomatic 
immunity, African States Parties could not be required to arrest and 
surrender him to the ICC without Sudan’s approval.114
The AU’s notion that al-Bashir could not be apprehended and 
surrendered to the Court was challenged in a hearing before the Court’s Pre-
Trial Chamber (“PTC”).115 The PTC concluded that al-Bashir was not 
entitled to immunity because the UNSC had referred the situation in Sudan 
to the ICC, as allowed by article 13(b) of the Rome Statute,116 by calling on 
the  parties involved in the conflict in Darfur to co-operate in bringing al-
Bashir to justice.117 Moreover, the PTC determined that al-Bashir held no 
immunity because of the implicit waiver that accompanies being a signatory 
to the UN Charter118: Sudan, as a UN Member State, was obligated to abide 
by the UNSC’s Resolution to surrender al-Bashir despite the fact that it was 
neither a signatory nor a Party to the Rome Statute. The PTC also concluded 
that States Parties, both in that role and as UN Member States, must abide 
by the UNSC’s Resolution.119 For better or for worse, the PTC’s rejection of 
the AU’s article 98(1) defense and its liberal reading of articles 13(b) and 27 
give the ICC access to the UNSC’s universal jurisdiction. Consequently, 
sitting heads of state who are alleged to have committed international 
crimes have few opportunities to avoid prosecution.
III.  The Delegitimization of the ICC
The ICC was created in order to deliver justice for the most heinous 
international crimes when national court systems are unable to do so.120
Despite the Court’s noble and admirable mission, it has always faced issues 
of legitimacy stemming primarily from how it handles sovereign 
114. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 685 (noting that Denmark also used this 
argument when it invited al-Bashir to Copenhagen).
115. The Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) is one of three divisions of the ICC, the other two 
being Trial and Appeals. The PTC is responsible for confirming or denying indictments. 
Additionally, “[t]he judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber will issue a warrant of arrest if there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction and that the person will not appear voluntarily before the Court, will endanger the 
proceedings or investigation, or will continue committing crimes if not arrested.” See INT’L 
CRIM. CT., Pre-Trial Stage, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Pre-Trial.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019).
116. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 223–36
(Mar. 4, 2009).
117. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 38 at ¶2; van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 683–84.
118. Id. at 684, 696–70.
119. Id. at 696–70.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 2; Human Rights Watch, Courting History: The 
Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years, (July 11, 2008).
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immunity.121 In fact, one of the reasons the United States decided not to 
become a Party to the Rome Statute was that the statute lacks “an effective 
mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions of American servicemembers 
and officials.”122 The U.S. rationale overlaps with two of the AU’s biggest 
concerns with the court: (1) that there is no immunity for sitting officials 
(discussed above in Part II) and (2) that the Court, as an institution, can be 
easily politicized (discussed here in Part III).123 The AU’s almost decade-
long campaign against the ICC has only bolstered its concerns and has 
served to further undermine the Court’s legitimacy, particularly among 
smaller or weaker states.124 If the beliefs and sentiments underlying the 
tenuous relationship between the ICC and the AU persist, the Court’s 
legitimacy may be even further undermined.
Allegations of ICC politicization come on the back of years of Western 
intervention in Africa, and the AU argues that the Court exists as a tool for 
the neo-colonialism and imperialism of more powerful Western countries.125
This argument has the power to delegitimize the Court by giving the 
appearance that the Court is no longer seeking justice based on a legal 
mandate but is instead politically motivated. This argument has mixed 
support. On the one hand, the Court was designed to exist outside of the 
racial hierarchies that were created centuries ago through slavery, servitude, 
and colonialism.126 Many of the Court’s supporters, including the 
International Development Law Organization’s Advisory Board Chairman, 
Professor Makau W. Mutua, and Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
believe the Court has managed to do so.127 For example, Chairman Mutua 
once said it was preposterous to accuse the ICC of racial hypocrisy,128 while 
Secretary General Annan made it known on multiple occasions that he 
believed the Court was not biased against Africans.129
121. Madeline Morris, The Jurisdiction of The International Criminal Court over 
Nationals of Non-Party States (Conference Remarks), 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 363, 363 
(1999).
122. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty, Release
No. 233-02 (May 6, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3337.
123. Seymour, supra note 6, at 110–13.
124. Id. at 111.
125. Id. at 112; see Hiroyuki Tosa, Global Constitutional Order and the Deviant Other: 
Reflections on the Dualistic Nature of the ICC Process, 18 INT’L REL. ASIA-PACIFIC 45, 57–
58 (2018). 
126. Tosa, supra note 125, at 64–66; see generally Preparatory Committee on 
Establishment of International Criminal Court, Conflict Between Security Council Powers, 
International Court, Discussed in Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. L/2777 (Apr. 4, 1996).
127. Seymour, supra note 6, at 120.
128. Id.
129. Annan Defends International Criminal Court, NEWS24 (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.
news24.com/Africa/News/Annan-defends-International-Criminal-Court-20131007; “I Stand 
by the ICC”, Kofi Annan Says, THIS IS AFRICA (Nov. 21, 2016), https://thisisafrica.me/stand-
icc-kofi-annan-says; The International Criminal Court Is Not Biased Against Africans: Kofi 
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For many, though, it is difficult to believe that the ICC is not biased 
when ten of the eleven cases currently being investigated are from Africa.130
For instance, former Ethiopian Primer Minister Hailemariam Desalegn once 
stated, “African leaders have come to a consensus that the [ICC’s] process 
that has been conducted in Africa has a flaw. The intention was to avoid any 
kind of impunity . . . but now the process has degenerated to some kind of 
race hunting.”131 Kenyatta, who admittedly has his own biases against the 
Court, has also made similar claims, stating, “[w]e would love nothing more 
than to have an international forum for justice and accountability, but what 
choice do we have when we get only bias and race-hunting at the ICC?”132
Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town Desmond Tutu shared this sentiment, 
stating, “[i]n a consistent world, those responsible for this suffering and loss 
of life should be treading the same path as some of their African and Asian 
peers who have been made to answer for their actions in the Hague.”133
Desalegn’s, Kenyatta’s, and Tutu’s comments show that despite the 
Court’s efforts—and Mutua’s and Annan’s words of support—it has failed 
to function outside of global racial hierarchies. It has failed for two specific 
reasons: first, because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of existing 
outside of racial hierarchies as a multilateral organization; and second,
because of the Court’s relationship with the UNSC.
A.  The ICC in the Context of Existing Global Systems
As a multilateral judicial organization, the ICC must navigate the global 
systems—whether financial, political, or social—that existed before its 
creation. Because of its position as an international institution for justice, 
the Court is forced to interact with, and must consequently challenge, the 
racism that is embedded in the international system of justice as a result of 
the legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism.134 Admittedly, this is not 
an easy task for the Court, but it is one that it must tackle—and tackle with 
care—if the Court is to gain supporters and maintain its legitimacy in the 
Annan Says, THIS IS AFRICA (June 22, 2016), https://thisisafrica.me/the-international-criminal-
court-is-not-biased-against-africans-kofi-annan-says.
130. ICC Situations, supra note 4.
131. Patryk I. Labuda, The International Criminal Court and Perceptions of 
Sovereignty, Colonialism and Pan-African Solidarity, 20 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 289, 310 (2014). 
132. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of Kenya, Speech at the Extraordinary Session of Heads 
of State and Government of the AU (Oct. 12, 2013), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/
2000095433/speech-by-president-uhuru-kenyatta-at-the-extraordinary-session-of-the-african-
union.
133. Desmond Tutu Calls for Bush, Blair to Face Hague, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 2, 2012), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20120902-desmond-tutu-calls-bush-blair-trial-hague-iraq-war-
weapons-mass-destruction-uk-usa.
134. Tosa, supra note 125, at 57. The legacy of slavery, servitude, and colonialism is 
particularly shown in the countries that are able to dominate the proceedings of the UNSC, 
and thus the ICC, despite not being Parties to the Rome Statute. Id.
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global arena, especially in Africa. In a speech he made after al-Bashir’s 
indictment, Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda, stated:
Rwanda cannot be party to ICC for one simple reason . . . with [the] 
ICC all the injustices of the past including colonialism, 
imperialism, keep coming back in different forms. They control 
you. As long as you are poor, weak there is always some rope to 
hang you. ICC is made for Africans and poor countries. Two thirds 
of the countries that have signed for this ICC are these poor 
countries. When they were signing they didn’t know what they 
were signing. They don’t know they were signing for a rope to 
hang themselves.135
Statements like these regarding the flawed and biased nature of the 
Court sound in truth to many state leaders who collectively have the power 
to undermine the Court’s legitimacy. As it stands, the Court’s actions in 
Africa have only fueled the belief that when the Court acts against weaker 
and poorer countries in Africa (and around the world), it does so for colonial 
and imperialistic reasons on behalf of the West.136
B.  The UNSC’s Control over the ICC
The Court’s relationship with the UNSC serves as further troubling 
proof that the West has some control over the Court’s actions. As seen in al-
Bashir’s case, the UNSC has the ability to refer—and defer—cases to the
Court.137 The UNSC is comprised of fifteen members, five of which—the 
United States, France, Britain, China, Russia—are permanent members with 
the other ten being rotating members.138 As permanent members of the 
UNSC, the United States, France, and Britain coordinated a referral of the 
Darfur situation to the ICC.139
UNSC members which are not party to the Rome Statute—like the 
United States, China, and Russia—may still vote on whether the Court 
should indict and try citizens of any country across the world.140 Unlike the 
135. Kezio-Musoke David, Kagame Tells Why He Is Against ICC Charging Bashir,
DAILY NATION (Aug. 3, 2008). Note that this author searched for an original transcript of 
Kugame’s statement in vain. The Daily Nation’s version appears authoritative.
136. See Tosa, supra note 125, at 55–56.
137. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 695–97.
138. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, Members, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
content/security-council-members (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
139. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 
2005).
140. Recall that in Part II above it was noted that the UNSC can pass resolutions that 
bind all UN Member States. Currently, there are 193 recognized UN Member States, while 
only 122 States are Party to the Rome Statute. See UNITED NATIONS, Growth in United 
Nations Membership, 1945–Present, https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-
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Court, the UNSC has a political mandate; most, if not all, of its actions are 
politically motivated.141 The relationship between the Court and the UNSC 
compromises the Court’s role as an organization that is independent and 
outside the political realm.142 The UNSC’s influence over the Court allows it 
to direct the Court’s power in order to exact “international justice” on 
weaker, poorer countries that do not wield power in any international 
forum.143 This is extremely troubling, as three of the UNSC’s five 
permanent members have not bound themselves legally to the Rome Statute 
and the Court. For the weaker and poorer countries located in Africa, the 
UNSC’s control over the ICC is simply another neo-colonial tool to 
maintain the hierarchies that were set in place before, during, and after the 
Scramble for Africa.144
The unfettered access given to UNSC States that are not party to the 
Rome Statute is an issue the Court must contend with, but it has yet to see 
this entanglement as a problem.145 The current ICC Prosecutor, Fatou 
Bensouda, has previously stated that the Court is “not a tool in the hands of 
[Western] politicians who think they can decide when to plug or unplug 
us.”146 So far, however, the UNSC has referred cases from just two countries 
to the ICC—Sudan and Libya.147
C.  Responses to the Legitimacy Crisis and Impact on the ICC’s 
Prosecutions of African Heads of State
African leaders have responded to the biased and neo-colonial nature of 
the Court in various ways. For al-Bashir, that entails continuing to resist 
arrest and extradition to the Hague when he visits other African states. 
Despite the PTC’s ruling that Sudan should surrender al-Bashir and that UN 
Member States should arrest and extradite him pursuant to the UNSC’s 
resolution, al-Bashir has yet to be apprehended and his trial at the ICC has 
yet to commence. In 2016, Quartz Africa reported that in the seven years he 
had been wanted by the ICC for war crimes (from 2009 to 2016), al-Bashir 
made seventy-four trips across the world.148 He continues his travels 
united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, States Parties to 
the Rome Statute, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
141. Bethel Aregawi, The Politicisation of the International Criminal Court by United 
Nations Security Council Referrals, ACCORD (July 21, 2017), https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-
trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nations-security-council-referrals.
142. Id.
143. Tosa, supra note 125, at 55–56.
144. Seymour, supra note 6, at 120–21.
145. Seymour, supra note 6, at 118–19.
146. Id.
147. ICC Situations, supra note 4.
148. Sudan’s President Has Made 74 Trips Across the World in the Seven Years He’s
Been Wanted for War Crimes, QUARTZ AFRICA (Mar. 4, 2016), https://qz.com/africa/630571/
216 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:195
unimpeded because African states, both those that are party to the Rome 
Statute and those that are not,149 continue to defy the ICC’s ruling by 
knowingly and willingly harboring a fugitive wanted by the Court.
With AU Member States flouting their legal obligations to the Court 
and their moral responsibilities to the world, it is difficult to say whether al-
Bashir will ever be apprehended and tried for the atrocities committed in the 
Darfur region. This impedes the ICC’s ability to effectively carry out its 
mandate. The ICC’s lack of a police force means the Court is wholly 
dependent on states to implement its decisions, and the AU’s conscious 
obstruction has hampered the Court’s ability to pursue justice for African 
victims.
Unlike the al-Bashir case, the Kenyatta and Ruto matters have been 
resolved. The AU opposed the ICC’s indictment of the Kenyans because 
their continuous presence at the trials in the Hague—as required by article 
63(1)150—would have a “negative effect on the demanding responsibilities 
of African presidents.”151 In order to prevent Kenyatta and Ruto from having 
to confront conflicting obligations, the Kenyan government and the AU 
took steps to terminate the cases, or at least to have them postponed while 
the two were serving as President and Deputy President.152 The AU lobbied 
to have Kenyatta and Ruto excused from constant presence during the 
course of their trials and argued that they should be able to choose which 
sessions of their trials to attend, so that they could still properly carry out 
their elected roles.153
In response, the Trial Chamber granted both Kenyatta and Ruto a 
conditional excuse from their trials, departing from the general rule of 
continuous presence in article 63(1).154 Explaining that Court judges have 
the discretion to “excuse an accused on a case-by-case basis,” the Trial 
Chamber excused Kenyatta and Ruto from all hearings except for opening 
and closing statements and the delivery of the judgment.155 However, the 
Appeals Chamber quickly reversed this ruling, deeming it “a blanket 
excusal before the trial had even commenced, effectively making absence 
the general rule and [their] presence an exception.”156 The Appeals Chamber 
did agree that judges had discretion in deciding which hearings could be 
sudans-president-has-made-74-trips-across-the-world-in-the-seven-years-hes-been-wanted-for-
war-crimes.
149. Since 2009, al-Bashir has made at least twenty-six trips outside of the African 
continent to China, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
150. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 63(1) ( “The accused shall be present during the 
trial.”).
151. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 165.
152. Id. at 165–66.
153. Id. at 165.
154. Id. at 166.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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missed,157 but absences must be limited to exceptional instances.158 The 
Appeals Chamber concluded that Kenyatta and Ruto would not have to 
attend all of their hearings but would still have to attend most.159
In light of this outcome, Kenya and the AU turned to the ICC’s 
Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) for recourse.160 The AU called on the 
ASP to amend articles 27 and 63 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(“RPE”).161 Consequently, the Assembly made three amendments to the 
RPE’s rules on presence at trial.162 The first two amendments allow 
defendants to appear at their hearings through the use of video technology 
and allow the Trial Chamber to excuse defendants for reasons deemed 
exceptional (as required by the Appeals Chamber). Additionally, the ASP 
inserted new Rule 134 quater, which states that requests for excusal by 
persons who are “mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties at the 
highest national level” are to be granted under a number of circumstances, 
including when it is in the interest of justice.163 The final amendment was 
adopted to ensure that the Trial Chamber expeditiously considers requests 
for excusal from defendants with extraordinary public duties.164
The amendments to the RPE were undoubtedly victories for Kenya and 
the AU, particularly the addition of Rule 134 quater.165 The rule effectively 
reversed the Appeals Chamber’s ruling on Kenyatta and Ruto’s presence 
during their trials.166 It “allows the absence of the accused to be the rule 
157. Id.
158. Id. at 166–67.
159. Id. at 167.
160. The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) “is the Court’s management oversight and 
legislative body and is composed of representatives of the States which have ratified or 
acceded to the Rome Statute.” The ASP’s role is to provide management oversight to the 
Presidency, the Prosecutor, and the Registrar regarding administration of the Court. 
Additionally, the ASP adopts the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of 
Crime. See INT’L CRIM. CT., Assembly of States Parties, https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
161. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 166.
162. Id. at 167 (noting that the amendments were Rules 134 bis, ter, and quarter). The 
ASP did not make any amendments to the articles. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 168.
165. Id. at 168–69.
166. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, INT’L CRIM. CT., rule 134 (2013). Rule 134 
quater allows for absence from trial proceedings in the Hague if the defendant has 
extraordinary public duties to attend to. The text of Rule 134 quater states: 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill 
extraordinary public duties at the highest national level may submit a written 
request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel only; 
the request must specify that the accused explicitly waives the right to be present at 
the trial. 2. The Trial Chamber shall consider the request expeditiously and, if 
alternative measures are inadequate, shall grant the request where it determines that 
it is in the interests of justice and provided that the rights of the accused are fully 
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rather than the exception and suggests that excusal decisions do not have to 
be on a case-by-case basis or that the period of the excusal has to be limited 
by what is strictly necessary.”167
Soon afterward, Kenya and the AU scored additional victories. In 2014, 
President Kenyatta kept an election promise by cooperating with the Court 
to prove his innocence.168 To do so, he briefly handed over the reins to Ruto, 
stepped down as President, and attended a hearing in the Hague in October 
2014.169 Nevertheless, shortly after his visit to the Court, Bensouda 
announced she had withdrawn all charges against him because the 
Government of Kenya had failed to cooperate with the Court.170 The 
Prosecutor stated that the government had failed to turn over relevant 
documents and had intimidated witnesses in Kenya.171 Sixteen months later, 
the ICC dropped its charges against Ruto as well.172 Despite Bensouda’s 
admonitions, Kenya and the AU claimed the dropped charges as victories.173
In their view, this was proof that the ICC was a politicized and hypocritical 
institution that only served as an ongoing threat to the stability and 
sovereignty of African states.174 In its almost decade-long campaign against 
the ICC, this proof was the AU’s biggest win yet.
In sum, African leaders have criticized the ICC for being hypocritical, 
inconsistent, and a tool for neo-colonialism.175 Though many of these 
accusations are self-serving,176 they hold some truth when considered within 
the context of the ICC’s role as a multilateral, justice-seeking organization 
working within historically racist structures and within the context of its 
relationship with the UNSC. The ICC’s actions in Africa do not instill 
confidence in the Court as the bastion for fairness and equality the continent 
expected it to be. From the AU’s perspective, the indictments of al-Bashir, 
Kenyatta, and Ruto demonstrate that the ICC has allowed itself to become 
politicized by the same Western countries that refuse to accede to it and to 
its founding treaty. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy as an apolitical, 
ensured. The decision shall be taken with due regard to the subject matter of the 
specific hearings in question and is subject to review at any time.
167. Knottnerus, supra note 1415, at 168.
168. Id. at 169.
169. Id.
170. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of Withdrawal of 
Charges, ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 2014).
171. INT’L CRIM. CT., Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
172. ICC Dismisses Case Against Kenya’s Ruto, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 5, 2016), https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/kenya-ruto-hear-icc-case-dropped-160405065408564.html.
173. Knottnerus, supra note 14, at 170.
174. Id.
175. Seymour, supra note 6, at 120–21.
176. Id.
Spring 2020] Sovereign Immunity, the AU, and the ICC 219
independent judicial body has been undermined. Until the Court addresses 
its lack of legitimacy, it will continue to lose the respect and support of 
African states and leaders, and those leaders will continue to undermine its 
work.
IV.  Solutions
If the Court continues down this path, the AU may move ahead with its 
threats to coordinate a mass withdrawal of its Member States from the 
Rome Statute. It is unlikely that the legitimacy the ICC does have could 
withstand such a withdrawal.177 Thus, in order to maintain some form of 
legitimacy, the Court needs to either move away from the overt 
politicization of its decisions or establish complementarity with the local 
courts of African states.
A.  Mass Withdrawal
Since al-Bashir’s indictment in 2009, the AU has proposed various 
solutions to side-step the ICC.178 The two that gained the most traction with 
AU Member States were the proposals to institute a mass withdrawal of 
African states from the Rome Statute and to create an independent, African 
court with the same subject-matter jurisdiction as the ICC.179 So far, neither 
plan has been fully implemented.180 While each proposed solution has its 
merits and drawbacks, the creation of an AU court that has an overlapping 
jurisdiction with the ICC is the better idea.
After its bi-annual summit held in January 2017, the AU “[a]dopt[ed] 
the [AU] ICC withdrawal strategy along with its Annexes, and call[ed] on 
Member States to consider implementing its recommendations.”181 The 
AU’s withdrawal strategy calls for mass withdrawal based on “the systemic 
177. Id. Unfortunately, the ICC lacks the institutional legitimacy that the UN enjoys as a 
result of its near universal membership and the support it receives from the most powerful 
states.
178. Ssenyonjo, supra note 14, at 386–388.
179. Konstantinos D. Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi, The International Criminal Court’s
Involvement with Africa: Evaluation of a Fractious Relationship, 82 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 417, 
445 (2013).
180. As of this writing, Burundi is the only African nation to have withdrawn from the 
ICC. See supra note 69. The AU adopted the Malabo Protocol in 2014 with the intent of 
merging the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the African Court on Peoples’
and Human Rights to create a court that would give African states primary jurisdiction over 
international and transnational crimes. The Protocol needs to be ratified by fifteen states to 
become effective, but so far it has only been ratified by seven. Maram Mahdi, Africa’s
International Crimes Court Is Still a Pipe Dream, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, (Oct. 
15, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-international-crimes-court-is-still-a-pipe-dream.
181. African Union Assembly, 28th Sess., Draft Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/
AU/Draft/Dec.1(XXVIII) Rev.1, ¶ 8 (Jan. 30–31, 2017).
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imbalance in international decision-making processes.”182 The document 
continues by highlighting the disproportionate and politically-motivated 
nature of the UNSC’s (and thus the ICC’s) decision-making process:
[t]he inherent politics of such processes result in unreliable
application of the rule of law. In this regard, the decisions of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are made on the basis of 
the interests of its Permanent Members rather than the legal and 
justice requirements. Needless to say, these interests are not always
in line with those of Africa, thereby leading to a perception of a 
double standard against African States.183
While the AU’s call for African states to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute and from the Court is understandable, it is ill-conceived. An exodus 
of African states would severely limit the number of states over which the 
Court has immediate jurisdiction. However, it would do little to stop 
African leaders from being indicted, as the UNSC’s referral power allows 
the Court to side-step the sovereign immunity of all UN Member States, 
even those that are not party to the Rome Statute.184
In the Constitutive Act of the African Union, its founding document, 
the AU claims that one of its goals is to ensure that the human rights of the 
peoples of Africa are promoted and protected.185 A withdrawal from the only 
body that is investigating and holding leaders accountable for the atrocities 
they commit would only serve to indicate that the AU believes maintaining 
political power is more important than securing and maintaining the rights 
and safety of the peoples of African states. Thus, instead of bolstering the 
AU’s place in the sphere of international justice, a mass withdrawal would 
only serve to further undermine the international rule of law and place a 
spotlight on the AU as a hypocritical organization.186
Notably, the loudest individual voices calling for the withdrawal of AU 
Member States from the ICC are those of leaders whose participation in 
conflicts within their own countries could rise to the level of an international 
crime.187 The call for withdrawal therefore seems to be a self-serving and
hypocritical attempt to shield actors who are committing egregious crimes 
from the reach of the Court. Yet, as shown above, the UNSC’s reach is long 
and simple withdrawal from the Court may not prevent these actors from 
being charged with committing international crimes in the future. Therefore, 
mass withdrawal would only create bad optics for the AU and the leaders of 
182. See Withdrawal Strategy Document, supra note 68, ¶ 8 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf.
183. Id.
184. See Part II supra.
185. A.U. Charter pmbl., art. 2.
186. Seymour, supra note 6, at 116.
187. Seymour, supra note 6, at 116.
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its constituent Member States and could delegitimize the regional body in 
the eyes of the international community.188
B.  Creation of a Regional International Crimes Court
While the AU’s withdrawal proposal is ill-advised, its proposal to 
establish an international criminal section of the African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples’ Rights is more meritorious.189 After discussing the 
latter proposal, the AU released a draft protocol to implement the proposal 
on June 27, 2014, called the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, or the Malabo 
Protocol.190 The newly proposed section of the African Court would have 
the same subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes as the 
ICC.191
A regional court with concurrent jurisdiction would serve the interests 
of both the ICC and the AU. Because the ICC steps in where there is no 
local court that is able to prosecute, the introduction of a regional court 
would help to limit the amount of time and resources it extends on the 
continent. The AU would also benefit from such an arrangement, if the 
regional court is able to mete out justice to the perpetrators of international 
crimes in a manner that is impartial, effective, and efficient.
However, even a regional court would still have to contend with issues 
of sovereign immunity. Foreseeing this problem, the draft protocol prevents 
heads of state from being prosecuted while they are in office.192 This 
protection disappears once they leave office: The proposal dictates that “the 
official position of any accused person shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”193 Nevetheless, as it relates 
to the pursuit of justice, the AU’s proposal is undoubtedly more limited in 
its ability to touch heads of state than the Rome Statute as it prevents the 
prosecution of heads of state while they hold office. While the proposal’s 
drafters may see that as a win, it risks creating even more dictatorships on 
188. See e.g., Regine Cabato, Philippines Leaves International Criminal Court as 
Duterte Probe Is Underway, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/philippines-leaves-international-criminal-court-as-duterte-probe-underway/
2019/03/18/f929d1b6-4952-11e9-93d0-64dbcf38ba41_story.html (speaking on the international
perception of Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte after he withdrew his country from the 
Rome Statute in March 2019).
189. Malabo Protocol, supra note 63.
190. Id.
191. Id. art. 28A. Both courts would hear matters on genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and crimes of aggression but, as it was meant to be more expansive and 
transnational, the African Court also has jurisdiction over other matters that the ICC does not, 
including the crimes of unconstitutional change of government, money laundering, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources, etc. Id.
192. Id. art. 46A bis.
193. Id., art. 46B(2).
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the continent. Namely, if the best way for heads of state to avoid charges is 
by never leaving office, it is likely that, given the opportunity, they will 
attempt to remain in power indefinitely.
Furthermore, the AU’s proposal does run into at least one additional 
issue: Inter-state power dynamics are bound to weave themselves into the 
decisions of regional courts. A regional court has the potential to encounter 
the same problems the ICC faces, with more globally dominant countries 
exerting control over the operations of the court. Just as in the global 
context, certain states within Africa wield more power and wealth than 
others, and these are usually the states that have greater influence over the 
actions of the rest of the continent.194 It follows, then, that these same states 
and their leaders have the potential to control the prosecutorial agenda of the 
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights. This domination
has the power to undermine the legitimacy of that court just as much as the 
UNSC’s domination has the power to undermine the ICC’s legitimacy.
C.  Solutions for the ICC
There are changes that the ICC can make to regain some legitimacy in 
the eyes of the AU and its supporters, thereby preventing the mass 
withdrawal of African states. Severing or lessening the relationship between 
the ICC and the UNSC, returning to the expected principles of fairness and 
transparency that brought African nations on board, and making an effort to 
work alongside the legal and cultural institutions that are in place in African 
nations to counter the impression that they are working against them would 
help the Court to regain some of its legitimacy.
The ICC could minimize or sever its relationship with the UNSC. As 
the relationship stands, the UNSC exerts too much influence over the Court. 
This is both hypocritical, as three-fifths of the Security Council’s permanent 
members are not themselves Parties to the Rome Statute, and problematic, 
as the UNSC politicizes the Court and its work.195 Indeed, it is particularly 
disturbing when the Court argues “that it derives its moral authority from its 
claim to pursue international criminal law on legal rather than political 
grounds.”196 The Court’s flawed self-narrative cloaks it in pretense and 
strengthens the AU’s evidence against it by showing that the Court is being 
deliberately hypocritical in how it operates or naively unaware of how it 
actually functions in the world.
To restore its legitimacy with African states, the Court should also 
engage in other forms of what scholars have dubbed “hypocrisy 
194. Power Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/news/
best-countries/power-rankings (last visited Dec. 17, 2019) (ranking Egypt, South Africa, and 
Nigeria as the three most powerful nations on the African continent).
195. Seymour, supra note 6, at 111.
196. Id. at 110.
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management.”197 In essence, the Court should realign itself with the ideals 
that brought African states on board with the implementation of the Court 
decades ago. In particular, the Court must return to being a body that seeks 
justice under law and which is not motivated by politics. To re-establish this 
ideal, the Court must, if it retains its connections to the UNSC, make 
transparent, published, and in-depth evaluations of the merits of any UNSC 
charging recommendations. Such measures would allow the Court to at least 
appear impartial.
Additionally, the Court should work with the social and political 
mechanisms that exist in the specific regions where it is engaged. Because 
“the ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it 
operates, is Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and stand points 
it reflects and embeds are uncompromisingly European,” it is almost 
inevitable that Western norms and ideas permeate the operations of the 
Court.198 Like nearly every other international organization, “[d]istinctively 
Euro-American ideals and narratives determine [its] perspectives and 
standpoints.”199 This is because Europe acts as a “geographical, political, 
and conceptual epicentre of international legal thought.”200 In using the 
mechanisms created by and employed by Western and European countries, 
the Court runs the risk of isolating non-Western countries like those in 
Africa.
In contrast, if it employs a prosecutorial system that fits within the 
structures that currently exist in each region, the Court has a greater chance 
of building relationships with states and of ultimately receiving their 
cooperation and support.201 In particular, the Court could undertake two 
simple measures that would allow for better integration and cooperation 
between itself and AU Member States. First, the ICC Prosecutor could 
travel to all African states to meet with regional judiciary, prosecutors, 
lawyers, and civil society in an attempt to establish constituencies in each 
country that would help create or enhance support for the Court. Second, the 
President of the Court and the President of the Assembly of States Parties 
could plan and engage in “programmatic activities at the national, regional 
and international levels for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers from state 
parties to enhance [their] knowledge and understanding of the ICC’s work 
and to enhance complementarity within the state parties.”202 This is vital to 
the Court retaining (or regaining) its legitimacy, especially in Africa.
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Remember that the relationship between the ICC and the AU soured 
because of the Court’s perceived bias in prosecuting African leaders. 
Requiring the leaders of the Court to visit African states could help to 
improve the standing of the Court across the continent by offering an 
alternate view of the work the ICC does. Unsurprisingly, citizens of each 
AU Member State are likelier to come across their leaders’ sentiments about 
the ICC than the ICC’s own representations of its actions. By presenting its 
own narrative to African peoples, the ICC could help bolster its reputation 
with the citizens of each country by offering an alternate view of the work 
the Court is attempting to accomplish. As a result of hearing alternative 
perspectives, each citizen would be better positioned to form an independent 
opinion of the Court’s value. Furthermore, linkages between the Court and 
local justice systems should help both the Court and local justice
organizations bring about an equitable end to the impunity that plagues so 
many African states.
Not only would this effort enhance the ICC’s visibility and credibility, 
but it would also enhance the role of national legal systems through 
complementarity. Because it is bound by the principle of complementarity, 
the ICC can only investigate and prosecute international crimes when 
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so.203 The principle 
reflects the idea that it is preferable for international crimes to be 
investigated and prosecuted in the country where they occurred.204
Moreover, when local courts assist the ICC in carrying out its duties, it is a 
boon for a body that does not have a police force. This is particularly true in 
countries that are not signatories to the Rome Statute.
Additionally, this cooperation could help the Court learn how to work 
within the justice systems that are already in place in each country. Learning 
the particularities of each country’s justice system could allow the Court to 
work within or around the legal and cultural institutions at work in each 
nation.  Each African country has a legal system that in some respects 
operates differently from the Euro-American system that the ICC uses and 
that these countries are already hostile to. By creating a system which 
integrates aspects of those countries where it is investigating a crime, the 
Court has a greater chance of securing cooperation. This integration does 
not necessarily mean adopting the laws or rules of any given state, it could 
be as simple as holding proceedings in the country or in the region—a
proposal suggested by the UNSC when it issued the Resolution for al-
Bashir’s arrest.205
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V.  Closing Remarks
The ICC’s blanket rejection of sovereign immunity and its close 
relationship with the UNSC delegitimize the Court. As an organization that 
relies on the cooperation of states across the world, this is something the 
Court cannot afford. While the ICC must be seen as a fair and impartial 
body in order to function, its decade-long fight with the African Union over 
the disproportional charges levelled against African nationals has weakened 
its stature with African states. This has led the AU to call for a mass 
withdrawal of African nations from the ICC and to propose the 
implementation of its own regional court to handle international matters. In 
order to repair its relationship with the AU and the African continent, the 
ICC needs to confront and remedy its own biases before it can expect to 
(re)gain the respect and cooperation of African states and their leaders. In 
order to do this, the Court has to sever or lessen its relationship with the 
UNSC which causes it to be more political than its original mandate 
intended, implement a system that allows for transparency (especially as it 
relates to UNSC Resolutions), and work with the legal and cultural 
institutions that are in place in the region to help foster cooperation among 
the parties. Impunity for international crimes is rampant on the continent. 
As it stands, the ICC is the only court that can hold those responsible to 
account, but its legitimacy hangs in the balance. If that remains true, it will 
be a detriment to the peoples of Africa.
including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to 
regional efforts in the fight against impunity”).

